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States and localities continue moving towards consumption taxes. Georgia’s lo-
cal governments displace a portion of their property tax receipts with revenue 
from the Local Option Sales Tax. This paper employs a panel dataset of Georgia 
counties across two economic cycles to examine the effects of consumption tax-
es on the long- and short-run volatility of local own-source revenues.  We offer a 
mean-variance approach for considering correct revenue portfolio shares across 
tax-instruments.  Holding revenues constant we find that permanent substitu-
tion towards a consumption tax amplifies variability of own-source revenues, im-
plying that consumption taxes are overweighed in current revenue portfolios. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Currently, many state and local governments in the United States continue to debate moving 
away from the individual income and the property taxes, towards consumption taxes to finance the 
public sector.  Locally a limited substitution towards consumption taxes has been occurring for 
roughly thirty years.  One particular program is worthy of note because it makes such a substitution 
direct and specific.  Since the mid-1970s, Georgia’s local governments have had the option of 
substituting a sales tax for a portion of their property tax receipts.  This program, known as the 
Local Option Sales Tax (LOST), is now employed by the vast majority (all but two) of Georgia 
counties. An additional program, the Special Purpose Local Option Sales Tax (SPLOST), allows 
temporary increases in sales taxes to finance the construction of community infrastructure. 
In this paper we examine the revenue volatility of these popular taxes and their observed 
effect on both long-run volatility and short-run cyclical variability of local own-source revenues 
across the business cycle. Volatility is important to consider because reductions in the predictability 
of revenues can confound local governments fiscal planning and administration.  We note that 
volatility in and of its self is not necessarily that concerning, indeed positive revenue shocks are of 
course potentially useful, and can be rebated to taxpayers.  Further, a government that anticipates 
revenue shocks can create a fund to provide for negative revenue shocks.  However, if local 
governments do not anticipate increases in volatility there is cause for concern.  Local governments 
limited tax base and access to credit both work to reduce their ability to compensate for negative 
revenue shocks. Because of this concern we investigate revenue volatility answering the question, 
“On the margin, is the consumption tax a more volatile revenue instrument than the property tax that it replaces?”  
To learn the answer we engage panel data which includes all Georgia counties i over the two most 
recent economic cycles (1985-2005) to estimate the impacts of consumption taxes on measures of 
volatility of tax revenues.  Previous empirical work on tax elasticity has identified time-series 
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procedures which allow consideration of both long-term and short-term volatility measures by tax 
instrument.  We are interested in both because long-term volatility can impact tax capacity over time 
and short-term volatility can impact cash flow and financing requirements, in particular during 
downturns.   
A priori it is unclear whether substitution towards a consumption tax should amplify or 
damp the volatility of local revenue portfolios.  Modern portfolio theory suggests that diversification 
across tax instruments should stabilize revenues — at least up to a point.  Just as an investor might 
consider the risk-and-return dynamics of individual instruments to orient their portfolio toward the 
efficiency frontier, policy makers may consider instrument volatility directly when setting revenue 
policies. In this sense, our method and findings have direct tax-policy implications.  
Across the United States, two-fifths of the states currently allow their local governments to 
levy local option sales taxes (LOST) on top of the state portion of the general sales tax. And in 
general, local communities continue to increase their reliance on consumption taxes.  Revenue 
applications from LOST-like consumption tax programs vary from state to state and include rolling 
back property taxes (as in Georgia), funding capital projects, covering operating expenses of the 
general government, and funding schools.  A better understanding of consumption tax dynamics can 
allow policy makers better perspective on whether projected revenue streams are adequate for 
particular expenditure purposes.  As well, a better understanding of the revenue dynamics associated 
with changes in the portfolio composition should allow for planning around manageable deficiencies.  
For example if, as has been found elsewhere, consumption taxes prove to be more volatile revenue 
instruments over the short run, a local government that wanted to increase its reliance on this 
revenue instrument might wish to increase reserves (so called “rainy day funds”), or communicate 
volatility expectations to the financial intermediaries who supply marginal short-run capital (and with 
whom they negotiate terms).ii   
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Georgia’s LOST program stands out as very close to ideal for measuring volatility changes 
resulting from revenue portfolio composition because the LOST program is engineered to keep 
revenues roughly equivalent,iii allowing us to focus on the volatility exclusive of changes to expected 
returns, as illustrated by Figure 1.   
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
Georgia’s local policy makers are somewhat limited in adjusting the components of their 
local revenue portfolio, as local communities generally face a three percent cap on sales taxes.  
(These taxes are on top of a fixed state consumption tax of four percent. iv)  Notably, the cap on 
local sales tax authority is binding in the vast majority of Georgia’s counties at present, but while this 
is evidence of the popularity of local sales taxes, it does not necessarily follow generically that the 
constraint should be adjusted or done away with entirely.  In this paper we address this point directly.  
Our working question is expressed as follows: Starting from current revenue portfolio positions, is moving 
further in the direction of a consumption tax likely to move local governments towards or away from optimal revenue 
portfolio diversification? That is, to enhance or reduce revenue stability?  
To answer this query we present average elasticity estimates across our panel.  Elasticities are 
central to current active policy debates which must begin from current law and marginal impacts of 
change. Interest in expanding consumption taxes is certainly evident within Georgia, where there are 
currently two separate proposals to eliminate both the state personal income tax and the property 
tax.  These proposals go much further towards a consumption tax than our marginal short- and 
long-run analyses do.  We here describe two current proposals in Georgia for the reader who may 
otherwise be unfamiliar with them:  
1. The “Georgia One Tax,” State Senate Resolution 282, provides a 6.5 percent tax on all goods 
and services, “for state revenue in lieu of state ad valorem taxes and state income taxes. Such 
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taxes shall be repealed in their entirety not later than January 1, 2010, and the subsequent levy 
thereof shall be specifically prohibited.”  When combined with current local sales taxes, SR282 
would lift consumption taxes to a top rate of roughly 10 percent in Georgia.  
2. The “GREAT” Tax (“Georgia Repealing Every Ad Valorem Tax”), State House Resolution 900, 
would eliminate most state and local taxes, including property taxes, which would be replaced by 
a flat tax consisting of “a personal income tax at the initial rate of 5.75 percent and a business 
value added tax at the initial rate of 5.75 percent.”  
Both proposals are very provocative and are currently being debated in public and private 
forums.  The value of our current work is as follows:  Since eliminating either of these taxes is in fact 
an extreme case of expanding the revenue portfolio towards consumption taxes, a marginal analysis 
is useful.  If we find that marginal increases from the current proportion of consumption taxes are 
destabilizing, we cannot recommend any further increase in consumption tax proportions on these 
grounds.  Should evidence suggest that marginal increases in the reliance on the consumption tax 
improve revenue stability through marginal expansion of the consumption tax, we could not 
comment on what proportion of consumption tax is optimal. 
Moving away from direct focus on any set of policy proposals, generally it is clear that the 
sales tax adds to local own-source revenue and can diversify local revenue sources; it is also clear 
that sales tax revenues must follow consumption trajectories.  From these general tenets the sales tax 
may be expected to be more volatile in the local revenue stream over the business cycle – this point 
has been made often, and by many over time, especially as concerns sales and property tax 
substitutions.  In this case assuming no political preference over instruments, the policy 
recommendation would likely be to diversify so as to minimize impacts – leading in general to a 
diminished role for the consumption tax.  However, while consumption value trajectories differ 
from property value and income trajectories, they may do so in a useful way – as an extreme, take 
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the case of equivalent and simultaneous compensating variation across tax instruments over the 
short run (business cycle).  Clearly, if the consumption tax is found to vary in ways which counter 
other forms, then diversification towards the consumption tax may be warranted – even if 
consumption taxes are found to have a higher overall volatility.v  One can think of these revenue 
paths as being organic (that is, relating to underlying prices and preference), or as being structurally 
related (synthetic), as in the case of the current Georgia LOST program.  Indeed, to a large extent, 
Georgia’s LOST program should be considered well engineered, since property tax discounts are 
adjusted dynamically, annually.  As such, the majority of risks appear to exist in the short run. 
While the short run would seem most important, Seligman and Hou (2005) suggest that we 
should not disregard the long-run program dynamics.  As described therein, medium- to long-run 
trends in price evolution can translate a persistent bias into underlying tax capacity under current 
Georgia law.  Because the LOST program’s direct substitution between the consumption and 
property taxes exists more or less over any time-frame, it is fairly straightforward to compare the 
volatility of competing tax instruments over the longer term as well; so we estimate both long- and 
short-run marginal impacts.  The next section provides a brief summary of previous literature to 
help place our work in context.  Section III discusses our data and methodology. Section IV 
presents and discusses our results. The final section concludes with a summary and policy 
implications – both for Georgia and the state-local sector in general. 
 
II. PREVIOUS LITERATURE 
The literature on sales tax elasticity dates back to the early 1950s at least. Groves and Kahn 
(1952) document one of the first estimates of the income elasticity of state and local tax revenues 
from the 1930s to the late 1940s. Their focus was tax revenue stability of state and local 
governments for smooth operation and provision of public services. Mikesell (1977) considers 
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income elasticities of state sales tax components.  Fox and Campbell (1984) estimate detailed 
elasticities of ten categories of goods. They find that though the average long-run elasticity of the 
goods was only about 0.6, the categories showed varying annual fluctuations with the business cycle. 
This finding partly triggered subsequent studies that separated the long run from the short run.  Dye 
and McGuire (1991) work to estimate both the elasticity and stability of personal income and sales 
taxes, and find significant variation from the components of the structure of the two taxes. Building 
on previous studies, Sobel and Holcombe (1996) make methodological improvements for the 
estimation of separate long-run and short-run elasticities by correcting biases from trend non-
stationarity as well as difference non-stationarity problems.  More recently Bruce et al. (2006) use 
annual time series data from 1967 to 2000 to estimate long- and short-run elasticities as well as 
adjustment parameters. Their improvement is to consider state-specific tax environments. They 
obtain a long-run state mean value of 0.811; the short-run mean above equilibrium is 1.804 and the 
short-run mean below equilibrium is 0.149.    
Though there has been literature showing that the sales tax is pro-cyclical, there has not been 
much empirical evidence on the effects of the adoption of local sales tax programs on the volatility 
of government revenue over the business cycle. Seligman and Hou (2005) provide details on the 
particular laws governing substitution and estimate net average impacts of Georgia’s LOST program, 
in a panel data setting. This paper continues the long line of attention to revenue stability that started 
from Groves and Kahn (1952), incorporating the methodological improvements of Sobel and 
Holcombe (1996) and Bruce et al. (2006), and the county-level data developed by the University of 
Georgia’s Tax and Expenditure Data (TED) Center. The potential contributions of this paper fill 
gaps in the previous literature regarding the stability of revenues from LOST programs, in terms of 
both the long-run income elasticity collections and the short-run cyclical variability.  Thus we expect 
to contribute to the literature on sales tax elasticities and to the literature on local revenue 
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diversification.  Finally this work should help inform policy makers regarding possible consequences 
of the two current proposed major tax reform efforts mentioned in Section I.    
 
II. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
Our data and methods follow from the previous literature as described in Section II.  We 
document them more carefully here. Data come from several sources: Georgia Department of 
Revenue (DoR), Georgia Department of Community Affairs (DCA), the Georgia County Guide (GCG) 
– an annual publication series about local governments in Georgia,vi the US Bureau of Economic 
Analysis (BEA), the US Census, and the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS).  The University of 
Georgia’s Tax and Expenditure Data (TED) Center pre-assembled data from the Census, the 
Georgia DoR, and DCA for this project.  From these sources we construct a panel of all 159 county 
governments in Georgia; among these, two counties are dropped for missing observations, making 
the total 157. The sample years run from 1985 through 2005, a period that covers two recent 
macroeconomic business cycles.                                                                                                                                  
General conditions of local demography, wealth, and economy are considered via population, 
personal income, and unemployment rates.  Population in thousands is a proxy for the size of a 
county; per-capita personal income in thousands of year-2000 dollars is a proxy for relative returns 
to human and physical capital, and in this sense, then, wealth. We do not model economic cycles 
directly using a series like that available from the Business Cycle Dating Committee of the National 
Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), because those data are designed to address the national 
economy and thereby less likely to capture economic fluctuations at the regional and local level.  
Instead we account for the regional economy and its influence on local income and revenue 
indirectly via the local unemployment rates from BLS, and via a standard set of county- and year-
fixed effects. 
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  Revenues and debt financed cash-flows are obtained and considered as follows.  We obtain 
annual license and fee data, as well as per-capita LOST revenue and SPLOST revenue from Georgia 
DCA, and generate a set of binary variables to record the adoption of LOST and SPLOST across 
time.  Also obtained from this source are direct federal grants and state grants, as well as new issues 
of revenue bonds, general obligation bonds, and lease-purchase agreement obligations.  Property tax 
effort is considered via the millage rate, which is collected from Georgia DoR and verified against 
the Georgia County Guide (GCG).  Finance details come from Georgia DCA. The last three are all 
placed in per-capita real dollars.  We adjust revenues and expenditures by the state-local goods-and-
service deflator to year-2000 dollar equivalents.  Summary county income data are adjusted via the 
consumer price index for urban areas (CPI-U) in the South. This series arguably better encompasses 
dynamics than the state-local or more closely competing Urban-Atlanta series might for much of 
rural Georgia.  Table 1 lists variables used, their definition, as well as summary statistics. 
[Table 1 about here] 
Beyond the method described above we additionally bring to bear the rich literature on 
measurement of the income elasticity of tax revenues that we have detailed in section II.  In 
particular we emphasize the necessity of accounting for non-stationarity issues within our panel – 
even after adjustment to real and per-capita measures.  Non-stationarity is important in this context 
because overall levels of taxation, and in particular sales tax rates, are upward trending over much of 
the period of study within our panel. Following conventional literature and the standard technique 
of calculating the long-run income elasticity of taxes (Groves and Kahn 1952; Friedlaender et al. 
1973; Legler and Shapiro 1968; and Fox and Campbell 1984), generally the model is: 
( ) ( ) 1+  +      it it itln ln yτ α β ε=        (1) 
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This model regresses the log form of tax revenue, itτ , against the log form of income, ity . 
Here βˆ is our long-run elasticity measure which directly estimates how much tax revenues increase 
for each percentage increase of income.  In such a setting estimates for particular taxes may be 
conducted either separately or in unison depending on the composition of  itτ . Herein we construct 
it to be a broad measure of own-source revenues, comprised of property taxes, Local Option Sales 
Tax receipts (LOST and SPLOST), excise use taxes, license and permit fees, service charges, and 
“other” revenues, in per-capita dollars.  
Sobel and Holcombe (1996) point out the distinction between measures of long-run 
elasticity and short-run cyclical variability.  The former is a measure of the long-term variation; the 
latter is the short-term, or cyclical, variability in tax revenue. Their model for short-run cyclical 
variability is: 
1 2 1[ ( ) ( )] + [ ( ) ( )]+    it it it it itln ln ln y ln yτ τ α β ε− −− = −      (2) 
Thus formulae (1) and (2) describe the generally accepted approaches to modeling long-run elasticity 
(via the log, log form of formula (1)), and short-run variation (via the first-differencing of (1)) in 
revenue as a function of income.  From this starting point, however, because our focus is on 
volatility about these values we consider the magnitudes of errors in predicted values.   
Generally one has the correct intuition that absolute deviations from predicted values, the itε , 
become important to consider given our working hypothesis.  Indeed we are concerned with 
volatility of revenues in this paper, and so to estimate the effects of the programs of the local option 
sales taxes, we next build dependent variables from the preliminary regressions. Specifically, from 
equation (1), having obtained our elasticity estimate, 1ˆβ  we next interact income, ity , and obtain the 
expected tax revenue, 1  ˆ itτ . Then, we derive the absolute difference between actual tax revenue and 
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expected tax revenue    ˆit it itτ τ τ′ = − . This error-in-prediction is our dependent variable for the long-
run effect of LOST programs: 
( ) ( ) ( )1  3  + +  +      it kit it itln ln ln Xτ α β τ γ ε′ =       (3)  
whereγ measures the relationship between revenue volatility and additional independent controls, 
itX .   
Following a similar procedure from equation (2) using 2βˆ , we obtain a dependent variable 
for the short-run cyclical variability of tax revenue, 2  itτ ′ .   Our two-step procedure [(2), (4)], thus 
yields a short- term volatility measure: 
( )2 2 1 4 1 1[ ( ) ( )] + [ ( ) ( )]+  +    it it kit kit it it itln ln ln ln X Xτ τ α β τ τ γ ε− − −′ ′− = − −    (4) 
 
In the latter two formulas, (3), (4) the constructed measures, kitτ , are the emphasized variable of 
interest, and subscript k references the tax instruments of particular interest.  Elements of X may 
include log transforms, and/or other scaling transforms.  
Summary statistics of the two dependent variables are also included in Table 1.  Our first 
dependent variable, the long-run volatility measure constructed via Formula (1), gives us an initial 
mean by which to evaluate the regression estimates included as tables 2 and 3; we will discuss these 
in greater detail, but importantly the reader should observe that the standard deviation about these 
baseline measures is itself very high in relative terms, suggesting that revenue volatility is a more 
serious concern in some local communities than in others.   
Independent variables are organized into groups of sales taxes, property taxes, alternate 
financing instruments, and summary economic indicators.  The sales tax group includes both the 
Local Option Sales Tax (LOST) and the Special Purpose Local Option Sales Tax (SPLOST).  We 
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observe 90 percent of counties levy a LOST, and two-thirds of counties levy a SPLOST.  Per-capita 
LOST revenues average about $54.5, SPLOST revenues are roughly equivalent.  This makes sense as 
both taxes are levied at the rate of one percent. Variation about the mean is higher for SPLOST 
levies than for LOST levies – this is likely due to the quarterly nature of the SPLOST; some 
collection mandates expire mid-year, whereas our data series are annual. vii  
The property tax group considers both millage rates and collections. Millage rates average 
about 25 mills per thousand dollars of assessed property value; the standard deviation about this 
mean is relatively low.  Per-capita revenues are about $184; thus, LOST average about 3/10ths of 
the per capita property tax revenue; however, volatility of LOST is proportionally higher being close 
to 38 percent of the volatility of property tax.  To the casual observer, volatility of the property tax 
looks higher over this period – perhaps especially because variation about this mean is a bit higher 
than variation in the mills would otherwise suggest.  In these summary measures, however, the 
variation observed is due to variation in property values and variation in household population 
densities. 
 Alternate financing instruments we consider include three basic instruments, local bonds, 
lease-purchase agreements, and grants from the state and federal governments.  Both general 
obligation and revenue bonds are not very popular; however, in a few cases the levels of per-capita 
debt are very high.  This pattern of low average usage, with much higher levels in top percentiles 
generally, is true for lease-purchase agreements and for grants as well.  State grants are generally the 
most popular alternate finance mechanism; even for these instruments, however, the standard 
deviation overwhelms the mean, suggesting they are rather discriminately employed to finance 
expenditures at the local level. 
 Our final group of economic indicators highlights the variation of population, income and 
unemployment rates experienced across Georgia counties over the sample period.  On average a 
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county is comprised of roughly 45,000 persons earning roughly $20,000 each, and has an 
unemployment rate of about 6 percent; however, variation about these mean values does appear to 
be both statistically and economically large. 
 
IV. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 Tables 2 and 3 present the results of empirical analyses.  We emphasize two basic sets of 
regressions for each of the formulae in each table. The first and third columns focus on binary 
treatment of sales tax instrument(s) and property tax millage rates, with the first column (I) focusing 
on the long-run (elasticity-based) dependent variable, and the third column (III) focusing on the 
short-run (first-difference-) based dependent variable.  Columns II and IV focus on dollar measures 
of collections from these revenue instruments in the long and short run, respectively.  Table 3 
differs from Table 2 in that here we exclude the SPLOST instrument.  Theoretically we exclude 
SPLOST because it is by nature not a permanent instrument, and so we fear it may appear to 
amplify undesirable volatility, when really it is expected to be temporary, and poses no real 
unaccounted for concern in these terms.  We will discuss these results in a moment, after a focused 
consideration of Table 2. 
[Table 2 about here] 
 Table 2 employs the same grouping of variables as do the summary statistics in Table 1.  
Here, we often magnify dollar values to be in thousands, a more useful metric when generalizing our 
results in terms of policy.  First, before considering the variable groupings we offer the reader a 
chance to consider our results for measured constants, as compared to the summary statistics 
offered in Table 1.  These are important baselines useful for interpreting the magnitudes one should 
associate with our results.  In Table 1 recall that our measure of long-run volatility is higher than for 
the short run, and that standard deviation is proportionately lower.  (In either case standard 
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deviations are quite high relative to the mean values.)  When we consider the reported constants in 
Table 2, by contrast, we find that long-run volatility in lieu of considered factors would be much 
higher (0.159 and 0.27); this result is statistically significant at the one and five percent levels.  By 
contrast, in lieu of considered factors, short-run volatility would otherwise be much lower than 
reported within the summary statistics; however, the experiences of counties continue to vary greatly 
in our panel, and even after the consideration of included independent variables these constants are 
not stable statistically.  Given the very different dynamics of short-run and long-run constants, it is 
hard to compare the impacts of factors over these different time frames directly – the denominators 
are just too different.   To allow for direct comparisons, we present results where impacts for both 
the short and long run are described in terms of the long-run constants.  We choose the long-run 
measure as the base line because of both its greater magnitude and robustness.  The use of a larger 
denominator prevents sensationalizing or misreporting of instrument impacts. viii  
We begin with measures of sales tax.  We find that the LOST is associated with increases in 
volatility, either when considered in binary terms or in revenue terms – that is to say, the sign on our 
coefficients is always positive.  In the short run, both the binary implementation measure and the 
more continuous revenue measures are statistically significant at the one-percent level.  The relative 
magnitude is such that the LOST reportedly increases revenue volatility by 47 percent of our long-
run constant measure. Specifically, to see this result take the ratio:  LOST (column III) - to - 
Constant (column I). ix  When we consider revenue explicitly, LOST short-run volatility as reported 
in column IV measures about 185 percent of long-run constant volatility.  The measure is the ratio: 
LOST (column IV) - to - Constant (column II). By either measure, displacing property tax revenues 
with sales tax revenues amplifies short-run volatility about its long-run average in economically 
important ways.  SPLOST also seems to impact volatility in the short run, however, by damping its 
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level relative to the long-run constant.  The associated magnitude for SPLOST existence, and 
collections, are 15 and 44 percent, respectively. 
  Our results for the property tax appear much different.  All else equal we find that in the 
long run, increases in the millage rate increase volatility by about 2 percent of the long-run constant, 
whereas our long-run revenue measure of property taxes damps volatility by 56 percent 
(0.152/0.270).  One interpretation of the disconnect (change in sign) between these two measures 
relates to factors first discussed in our review of results from Table 1 – that it relates to county- 
specific variations in wealth, property values, and household population density dynamics across the 
panel.  Short-run results for property taxes are consistent in sign, always negative and thus 
suggesting a damping of measured long-run constant volatility; however, the millage rate result is so 
small as to appear to near zero in Table 2. The result is thus neither economically nor statistically 
significant.  Such is not the case for our short-run revenue measure – here we find a short-run 
damping of revenue volatility greater than reported long-run constant volatility of 104 percent 
(0.282/0.270). 
 Considering alternate financing instruments, only the lease-purchase and state grant 
programs yield consistent estimated impacts.  In the case of the lease purchase, we find that long-run 
revenue volatility increases by somewhere between about 32 percent (Col. II) and 60 percent (Col. I), 
while short-run volatility may be reduced.  The nature of a lease-purchase agreement is such that the 
result is not altogether surprising.  These deals may alleviate short-term financial hardship in much 
the same way as borrowing does.  To the extent they are associated with communities plagued by 
less predictable revenues, we would see this long-term result whether or not the leases themselves 
contribute to volatility over the long run.  State grants likewise predictably damp volatility, in both 
the short and long runs when compared to long-run constant measures.  Economic magnitudes here 
are large by any measure, being between 43 percent (Col. IV) and 105 percent (Col. I) of the 
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applicable measured long-run constant.  Again knowledge of the Georgia’s state grant program for 
local counties supports this conclusion; grants tend to be issued to communities in long-term need 
and short-term distress.  We attribute the weak statistical significance of the short-run measure to 
the idea that state grants have lagged effects both in terms of issuance and in terms of impact. Fertig 
and Seligman (2007) analyze Georgia’s state grants with results in line with those reported here. x 
Considering economic indicators, we find support for the reasonable conclusion that increases in 
per-capita real income damp long-run revenue volatility.  Results are statistically significant at the 
one-percent level; the magnitudes are relatively low, at 4 to 6 percent of the long-run constant 
volatility measure. 
 Table 3 replicates the regressions of table 2, omitting the SPLOST.  As described above, we 
omitted the SPLOST with an original intuition that it might be spuriously correlated with increased 
volatility.  However, we have found that SPLOST revenues reduce short-run volatility.  We are thus 
even more interested in dropping SPLOST, to see whether its inclusion is more fundamentally 
misguided.  A look across all columns shows that our results are very stable to the exclusion of 
SPLOST.  In column I, exclusion amounts to a test of robustness to irrelevant variables, whereas in 
the remaining three columns (related to long-run revenues and short-run binary and revenue 
measures) exclusion amounts to a test of robustness of the sensitivity of volatility measures to the 
exclusion of a temporary capital financing sales tax instrument.  Again we find the results to be 
remarkably consistent, a support for our measures and our basic method.  With respect to these 
measures, we interpret our finding to suggest that the SPLOST damps short-run volatility. This 
result is further taken to mean that most revenue volatility is otherwise skewed downward – our 
measured “revenue surprises” tend to be negative. 
[Table 3 about here] 
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V. POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
Our measures of revenue volatility are on whole negative, meaning that most revenue 
‘surprises’ take the form of shortfalls.  A direct implication is thus that policy makers should concern 
themselves with reducing volatility as they choose portfolio shares for revenue instruments.  (Indeed, 
if revenue surprises tended towards windfalls, concern would not be as warranted.)  The distinction 
in skew being made here is related to the distinction between the Sortino and Sharpe ratios in 
modern portfolio analysis, where the Sortino xi ratio treats up-side and down-side risks 
asymmetrically, appropriate whenever loss aversion is an important consideration.  This is arguably 
the case as local governments have limited access to capital and fairly consistent public service 
obligations. For local governments, negative revenue shocks are unwelcome and can create hardship, 
at least in the short run.  For this reason, local governments must care for their revenue portfolios in 
much the same way that an investment adviser would a financial portfolio – keeping an eye on both 
the short- and long-run measures of volatility in order to manage cash inventories, and the many 
public services on which communities rely for proper functioning. 
 Here we have consciously focused on two basic instruments within local government 
revenue portfolios, the sales and the property taxes, and placed them in the context of the broader 
revenue and debt finance, and transfer income portfolios available to local communities.  We are 
fortunate to have had access to data focused on all counties in Georgia, because Georgia law creates 
a direct substitution between our two revenue instruments of focus which is adjusted annually.  This 
allows us to focus on volatility in a much more controlled environment than would otherwise be 
possible. 
 Our findings that the local sales taxes are related to very significant increases in short-run 
volatility, and that property taxes are related to more modest decreases in both the long- and short-
run volatility, are important for current debates regarding the efficacy and efficiency of revenue 
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collection both within Georgia and more broadly speaking. Within Georgia, the implications for the 
current debate regarding either the “One Tax” or the “G.R.E.A.T.” tax, as well as the debate in the 
past few years concerning education finance, suggest that without new methods for smoothing 
revenues across annual budget cycles, these taxes are likely to be less stable platforms to service the 
needs of communities.  In the case of the “One Tax” we have to additionally point out that, to the 
extent Georgia increases its reliance on sales taxes simultaneously, the opportunity to stabilize local 
finances via the current state grants program may be curtailed – placing county finances at greater 
risk than otherwise.   
There is no reason we can find to suspect that these results are limited to counties; most 
Georgia municipalities manage similar revenue portfolios.xii  Further, to the extent that sales and 
property taxes are constructed consistently across the United States, our findings are likely to hold in 
other regions – especially where direct substitution between these instruments is the norm, as it is in 
Georgia.  Otherwise volatility impacts are likely to be felt incrementally as a result of the relative 
expansions or reductions of either tax’s share of the revenue portfolio.  Seligman and Hou (2005) 
mention that some of what has driven revenue collections by either the property or consumption tax 
is related directly to the evolution of relative prices.  Over much of the period we study, goods 
inflation has been relatively mild and property values have risen markedly. It is unclear whether 
these trends will continue in the future; however, previous literature which examined periods from 
the 1930’s forward is consistent with our work, suggesting that any current change in these relative 
price trends would not warrant dramatic portfolio changes for revenue instruments.   
 In summation we emphasize that while our results agree with much of the previous work, 
we find no reason to entirely do away with any revenue instrument currently in use.  A prudent 
government will always find value in diversification of revenue sources; the issue is merely one of 
proportion.  Our work suggests that, holding revenues to be roughly equal, further movement 
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towards consumption taxes cannot be justified in terms of reducing financial volatility.  Any change 
in current law based on justification along other grounds which increases consumption taxes as a 
proportion of revenue portfolios should include measures to actively manage volatility and thus the 
expense of financing local government via this instrument. 
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Table 1:  Summary Statistics
Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Dependent Variables:
Long-Run Volitility of Total Revenues 3,234                  0.097 0.096 0.000 1.379
Short-Run Volitility of Total Revenues 3,054                 0.087 0.105 0.000 1.536
Independent Variables:
Sales Taxes
LOST tax (binary indicator) 3,236                  0.90 0.30 0.00 1.00
SPLOST tax (binary indicator) 3,236                  0.67 0.47 0.00 1.00
Per-Capita LOST Revenues 3,235                  $54.42 $33.76 $0.00 $357.26
Per-Capita SPLOST Revenues 3,235                  $53.09 $52.42 $0.00 $276.20
Property Taxes
Millage Rate (in Mills) 3,277                  24.51 5.93 5.88 50.48
Per-Capita Property Tax Revenues 3,235                  $184.09 $89.64 $0.00 $895.93
Alternate Financing Instruments
Per-Capita General Obligation Bond 2,014                  $9.83 $61.57 $0.00 $1,046.87
Per-Capita Revenue Bond 2,018                  $12.11 $62.51 $0.00 $1,031.46
Per-Capita Lease/Purchase Revenues 2,168                  $11.51 $48.68 $0.00 $905.54
Per-Capita Georgia State Grant 3,234                  $29.93 $32.60 $0.00 $762.45
Per-Capita Federal Grant 3,234                  $5.83 $19.60 $0.00 $490.43
Economic Indicators
Population 3,235                  44,242 96,024 1,788 915,623
Per-Capita Real Income 3,291                  $19,630.02 $3,981.30 $11,678.63 $45,916.00
Unemployment - Local Rate 3,291                  6.09% 2.24% 1.40% 19.50%
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Table 2:  Volatility Impacts of Revenue Instruments -- in the Long and Short Run
Dependent Variable:
I II III IV
 Sales Taxes:
LOST tax 0.019 0.075 ***
 (binary indicator) (0.019) (0.023)
SPLOST tax 0.007 -0.024 ***
 (binary indicator) (0.008) (0.009)
Per-Capita LOST Revenues 0.192 0.499 ***
 (in thousands of dollars) (0.15) (0.18)
Per-Capita SPLOST Revenues 0.015 -0.118 *
 (in thousands of dollars) (0.059) (0.069)
 Property Taxes:
Property Tax Millage Rate 0.003 *** 0.000
 (in Mills) (0.001) (0.001)
Per-Capita Property Tax Revenues -0.152 *** -0.282 ***
 (in thousands of dollars) (0.052) (0.061)
Alternate Financing Instruments:
Per-Capita Revenue Bond -0.003 -0.003 -0.009 -0.016
 (in thousands of dollars) (0.031) (0.031) (0.035) (0.036)
Per-Capita General Obligation Bond -0.020 -0.023 -0.028 -0.033
 (in thousands of dollars) (0.03) (0.03) (0.034) (0.034)
Per-Capita Lease/Purchase 0.096 ** 0.087 ** -0.018 -0.033
 (in thousands of dollars) (0.043) (0.043) (0.049) (0.05)
Per-Capita Georgia State Grant -0.167 *** -0.153 ** -0.121 * -0.116 *
 (in thousands of dollars) (0.06) (0.06) (0.069) (0.069)
Per-Capita Federal Grant 0.033 0.025 -0.012 -0.027
 (in thousands of dollars) (0.086) (0.086) (0.099) (0.1)
Economic Indicators:
Population 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
 (in thousands) (0) (0) (0) (0)
Per-Capita Real Income -0.009 *** -0.009 *** 0.000 0.001
 (in thousands of dollars) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Unemployment 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001
 (Local Rate) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Constant 0.159 ** 0.270 *** 0.003 0.101
(0.076) (0.072) (0.075) (0.063)
Observations 1,848 1,862 1,847 1,861
R-squared 0.26 0.26 0.240 0.240
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Long-Run Volatility Short-Run Variability 
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Table 3: Volatility Impacts of Non-SPLOST Revenue Instruments -- in the Long and Short Run
Dependent Variable:
I II III IV
 Sales Taxes:
LOST tax 0.018 0.075 ***
 (binary indicator) (0.019) (0.023)
Per-Capita LOST Revenues 0.194 0.477 ***
 (in thousands of dollars) (0.15) (0.18)
 Property Taxes:
Property Tax Millage Rate 0.003 *** 0.000
 (in Mills) (0.001) (0.001)
Per-Capita Property Tax Revenues -0.152 *** 0.000 ***
 (in thousands of dollars) (0.052) (0)
Alternate Financing Instruments:
Per-Capita Revenue Bond -0.003 -0.002 -0.011 -0.018
 (in thousands of dollars) (0.031) (0.031) (0.035) (0.036)
Per-Capita General Obligation Bond -0.020 -0.023 -0.030 -0.034
 (in thousands of dollars) (0.03) (0.03) (0.034) (0.034)
Per-Capita Lease/Purchase 0.097 ** 0.088 ** -0.021 -0.041
 (in thousands of dollars) (0.043) (0.043) (0.049) (0.049)
Per-Capita Georgia State Grant -0.165 *** -0.152 ** -0.127 * -0.118
 (in thousands of dollars) (0.06) (0.06) (0.069) (0.069) *
Per-Capita Federal Grant 0.034 0.025 -0.014 -0.025
 (in thousands of dollars) (0.086) (0.086) (0.099) (0.1)
Economic Indicators:
Population 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
 (in thousands) (0) (0) (0) (0)
Per-Capita Real Income -0.009 *** -0.009 *** 0.000 0.000
 (in thousands of dollars) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Unemployment - Local Rate 0.001 0.000 0.002 0.001
 (Local Rate) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Constant 0.167 ** 0.272 *** -0.026 0.096
(0.075) (0.072) (0.074) (0.063)
Observations 1,848 1,862 1,847 1,861
R-squared 0.260 0.260 0.230 0.240
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Long-Run Volatility Short-Run Volatility
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Figure 1:  Mean and Variance in Local Government Revenue Portfolios 
 
 
 
Under Georgia Law Local Option Sales Tax  
(LOST) revenues displace other collections, 
thus no tradeoff between risk and return 
exists.  The objective in this situation is simply 
to minimize the variance in collections.
Variance in Revenues
Average
(Expected) 
Revenues
A:  Classic Revenue Portfolio Tradeoff
Direction of improvement
Applying standard portfolio theory, a curve like 
“A” denotes the risk‐return tradeoff  to 
increasing reliance on any one revenue source 
(for example, consumption taxes).  
Notice that along the lowest portion of the 
curve (green) it is possible to increase revenues 
and reduce their variability at the same time by 
increasing reliance on an underused revenue 
source.  
=
Variance in Revenues
Average
(Expected) 
Revenues
B:  LOST Revenue Portfolio Tradeoff
Direction of improvement
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i Two of the 159 counties are dropped due to missing observations.  
 
ii One should not assume that communication with lenders is meaningless.  Indeed, Seligman (2006) analyzes U.S. Treasury 
short-term finance, identifying practices that reduce costs for cash management, even for the case of what is indisputably the 
very best credit risk in the world.  Significantly, what lies behind true efficacy in reducing public sector costs is proper cash 
inventory management both by the public and private banking sectors.  
 
iii Seligman and Hou (2005) investigate revenue patterns and describe why this equivalence is less than perfect.  However, the 
isolation of relative volatility components, though review of sales tax collections and a resetting of property assessments, 
benchmarks the equivalence annually.  Importantly the authors know of no better setting in which to isolate the second 
moment of the revenue distribution, variance, from expected returns. 
 
iv State consumption taxes were 3 percent before 1990. 
 
v Specifically consider a special case where property and income taxes have equivalent collections and resultantly equivalent 
magnitudes of variation, each being half as volatile as consumption taxes.  A counteracting consumption tax that was seemingly 
twice as volatile would be valuable to hold in a very high portfolio proportion.  Indeed let , ,p y cτ τ τ represent property, 
income, and consumption tax rates.  Then in this special case where 
1var( ) var( ) var( )
2p y c
P Y Cτ τ τ= = −
, 
over time periods t T∈  holding other factors constant, consumption taxes should make up an average of 50 percent of 
expected collections if minimizing revenue shocks is valued by local governments  
( ) ( ) ( )
1 1( )p t y t c t
T T
P Y C
t t
τ τ τ+ =∑ ∑ . 
 
vi  The Georgia County Guide is a summary statistical reference analogous to the U.S. Statistical Abstract. 
 
vii Additionally there is variation in the geography over which the two taxes {LOST, SPLOST} may be levied within a county as a 
result of revenue-sharing agreements between the counties, local municipalities, and special districts. 
 
viii This technique addresses the sensitivity of ratios to changes in the denominator.  Specifically in our work we find short-run 
constants are much lower than long-run constants.  Using short-run constants thus magnifies the relative impact of our short-
run coefficients in ways which make them both much larger and incomparable to estimates from our long-run analysis. 
 
ix This yields .474, or 47.4 percent.  We suggest this to be a prudent measure when compared to using the short-run constant 
as a base. Using the short-run measure yields a ratio 25 times the very erratic measure of expected (“Constant”) short-run 
volatility.  
 
x Specifically, Fertig and Seligman (2007) analyze the efficacy of Georgia state grants over a five-year cycle for the Augusta 
region.  In general they find that distress communities are more likely to hold a broader portfolio of grants both in terms of 
type (mechanism) and over time.  
 
xi For more on the Sortino Ratio, see Sortino and Price (1994). 
 
xii One caveat here, the authors note that municipalities are more likely to receive federal grants, and thus may be somewhat 
better shielded from volatility, should any of the current initiatives pass. 
 
 
